December 14, 2017

S/1997/973 – Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

United Nations

S/1997/973

  Security Council Distr.: General

12 December 1997

Original: English

 


Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council’s request in paragraph 16 of its resolution 1117 (1997) of 27 June 1997. My report on those aspects of the resolution that relate to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was submitted to the Council on 8 December (S/1997/962). The present report refers to my good offices mission.

2. In a communication dated 17 April 1997 addressed to the President of the Council (S/1997/320), I stated my determination to pursue intensified efforts to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem and my hope that it would be possible to convene direct talks between the two community leaders. In the same communication I informed the Council that I had decided to appoint Mr. Diego Cordovez as my Special Adviser on Cyprus with effect from 28 April.

3. In the most recent communication on my good offices mission, dated 20 June 1997 (S/1997/480), I informed the Council that earlier that month I had written to the two leaders inviting them to a session of face-to-face discussions in July. I envisaged that the first session would be followed by another one in August and by a third one, if necessary.

4. The first round of talks was held at Troutbeck, Dutchess County, New York, from 9 to 12 July. In my opening statement at the talks I stated that for 29 years the leaders of the two communities had engaged in discussions about issues that had been identified as the most crucial. These discussions were based on concepts and approaches that successive Secretaries-General had put forward in accordance with Security Council resolutions. I stressed that the search for peace in Cyprus should therefore continue and noted that international backing for a negotiated solution was firmer than ever. The support of the Security Council had been consistently unequivocal and the presence at the talks of special envoys from a large number of countries was proof of the high priority that the international community attached to a viable and comprehensive solution.

5. The Troutbeck round of talks was held in a constructive and friendly atmosphere. The two leaders initiated the consideration of a draft statement intended to launch the process of negotiations that I had suggested, to set out the principles and objectives of the settlement and to establish the modalities for future negotiations. The two leaders affirmed throughout the talks their determination to reach a settlement. They subsequently met in Nicosia with my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel, to consider humanitarian matters. An agreement to achieve progress on the issue of missing persons was concluded on 31 July.

6. The second round of talks was held at Glion-sur-Montreux, Switzerland, from 11 to 15 August. At the opening, the Turkish Cypriot leader informed my Special Adviser that, in the light of the publication by the European Union of a document entitled “Agenda 2000”, and pending clarification of some of the statements contained in that document, he would participate in further discussions with the Greek Cypriot leader and with my Special Adviser but would not be able to adopt any formal understandings or agreements. Two further versions of the draft statement were considered but the talks ended inconclusively. In the circumstances, an early third round of talks would have been unproductive.

7. In discussions I had in New York with the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities, on 6 October and 3 November, respectively, I urged both leaders to show their political will to reach a settlement and to make a special effort to see recent developments in a positive light. I also informed them that I had instructed Mr. Cordovez to travel to Nicosia in response to the invitations that the two leaders had extended to him at Glion.

8. My Special Adviser visited Nicosia from 18 to 21 November for consultations with the leaders of the two communities. He also met with the political party leaders of the two communities and was briefed by my Deputy Special Representative and Chief of Mission on the overall situation and by the Force Commander and senior officers of UNFICYP on the operation of the Force. Mr. Cordovez subsequently visited Athens, Ankara and London, the capitals of the three Guarantor Powers, and Brussels. At the request of the special representatives on Cyprus, on 27 November Mr. Cordovez participated in a meeting held in Paris. On 2 December Mr. Cordovez briefed the members of the Security Council on all the discussions held during his trip and explained the new factors and circumstances, which will undoubtedly have a bearing on my good offices mission in the months ahead.

9. The message that I asked Mr. Cordovez to convey to the two community leaders, and to the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was that I remained committed to continue my good offices mission at the earliest appropriate time, bearing in mind that the electoral process is now quite naturally engaging the priority attention of the Greek Cypriot leader and his community. Heads of Government and high-level officials of many interested Member States, who are thoughtfully following my endeavours in this context, have urged me to do so, and I continue to feel that to allow the present status quo, which is precarious, to continue would entail serious danger.

10. During the consultations in Cyprus Mr. Cordovez proposed, and the two community leaders agreed, that he should return to Nicosia in March 1998 in order to discuss the detailed modalities of a continuing process of negotiations and hopefully set it in motion. The Turkish Cypriot leader raised with Mr. Cordovez questions regarding the status of the interlocutors at future talks. My Special Adviser noted that, in accordance with the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council, the mission of good offices on Cyprus was with the two communities, on an equal footing, and that the Secretary-General and all his representatives had been scrupulous in observing the political equality of the two communities and their leaders.

11. I remain convinced that it is essential to adopt new approaches and to ensure that the two community leaders will enter upon, as soon as possible, a continuing and sustained process of negotiations that will focus on the preparation of the actual legal instruments that will constitute the settlement.

12. I should like to place on record my appreciation to all those Governments that, given their interest in and concern about the Cyprus problem, have appointed special envoys in order to assist, and be kept informed of, my good offices mission. They have provided invaluable assistance and advice to my Special Adviser, who meets regularly with all of them for purposes of consultation and cooperation.

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S/1996/1055 – Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

United Nations

S/1996/1055

  Security Council Distr.: General

17 December 1996

Original: English

 


Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the Security Council’s request in paragraph 14 of its resolution 1062 (1996) of 28 June 1996 that I report on the implementation of that resolution. My report on those aspects of the resolution which relate to the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cyprus has already been submitted to the Council, on 10 December 1996 (S/1996/1016). The present report concerns my mission of good offices.

2. In the most recent report on my mission of good offices, dated 25 June 1996 (S/1996/467), I informed the Council that the considerable efforts undertaken during the previous 20 months had not succeeded in breaking the impasse in Cyprus. They had included a number of separate meetings between myself and the leaders of the two communities; direct talks between the two leaders hosted in October 1994 by my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel; various missions to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey by my then Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark; and efforts by a number of interested Governments.

3. In resolution 1062 (1996), the Security Council reiterated its concern that there had been no progress towards an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, reiterated that the status quo was unacceptable, and called upon the parties to demonstrate concretely their commitment to an overall settlement. The Council also called upon the two leaders to work with the Secretary-General and with the many countries supporting his mission of good offices to break the current impasse by establishing common ground on which direct negotiations could be resumed. The Council further recognized that the decision of the European Union concerning the opening of accession negotiations with Cyprus was an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement.

II. A REVIEW OF THE EFFORTS MADE SINCE JUNE 1996

4. In the course of the past six months, intensive efforts have been made to break the impasse and to create conditions for successful direct negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities.

5. As envisaged in my last report, my new Special Representative, Mr. Han Sung-Joo, undertook an extensive familiarization mission during the last week in June and the first half of July. In Cyprus he had two extended meetings with each of the two leaders, as well as meetings with political party leaders, businessmen and trade unionists on both sides. He went on to visit Athens and Ankara, as well as the capitals of a number of interested Governments, notably London, Moscow, Paris and Washington, and Dublin and Brussels for meetings with the Presidency of the European Union (EU) and the European Commission respectively. On subsequent occasions, he visited Bonn, London and Paris.

6. He found that the situation in the area remained very much as described in my last report. The positions of the two leaders appeared far apart on a number of issues. The Greek Cypriot leader emphasized that in order to avoid yet another unproductive direct meeting, it was necessary to ensure that sufficient common ground existed between the two sides before direct

talks began. He identified five key areas in which common ground had to be established: security, EU membership, territory, sovereignty and political equality. The Turkish Cypriot leader, for his part, reaffirmed his readiness to meet for direct talks within the parameters of an equal partnership and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. He opposed any change in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, including Turkey’s right of unilateral intervention. He was also opposed to Cyprus joining the European Union before Turkey, which, he believed, would negate what he regarded as the foundation of an overall settlement, notably bizonality and the Treaty of

Guarantee. It was thus clear that direct talks would not at that time yield positive results.

7. My Special Representative reported to me that his meetings with a broadcross-section of the two communities had revealed a plurality of views and opinions. He underlined the critical importance of support from Greece and Turkey if negotiations were to succeed. He saw the issue of the accession of Cyprus to the European Union as an important new factor. The decision by EU to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of its Intergovernmental Conference had in effect established a time-frame of approximately 18 months for the achievement of an overall settlement. It was therefore important for all concerned to redouble their efforts. He told me that this assessment was shared by his interlocutors in the capitals he had visited.

8. My Special Representative’s second visit to the area in mid-September was overshadowed by the incidents on 11 and 14 August and their aftermath, which had raised tensions on the island to a high level (see S/1996/1016, paras. 2-11). His discussions with the leaders of the two communities therefore focused on ways of reducing the tension. To this end, he built upon the efforts of my Deputy Special Representative to encourage the two leaders to issue a joint statement which would make clear that the incidents did not reflect the true sentiments of the people of the two communities; that such incidents must never occur again; that they underscored the urgent need to resolve differences through negotiation; and that the leaders pledged themselves to redouble their efforts to cooperate with the Secretary-General and work tirelessly to reach an overall settlement. The Turkish Cypriot leader agreed to such a joint statement but the Greek Cypriot leader considered that, given the circumstances surrounding the incidents, a joint statement would not be appropriate. However, he subsequently issued a statement of his own that the incidents must not dissuade the parties from pursuing with increased energy efforts to find an overall settlement under the auspices of the Secretary-General and that they could not be interpreted to mean that the two communities cannot live together in peace and prosperity in their common home, Cyprus. He also called upon both communities to make every effort to defuse the existing tensions.

9. Throughout the period covered by the present report, my Deputy Special Representative continued his regular meetings with the leaders of the two communities in an effort to promote the conditions for direct talks to achieve an overall settlement; to address the serious problems resulting from the August incidents and subsequent ones which also resulted in fatalities; and to lay the basis for the discussions which are currently under way between the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the military authorities on both sides on proposals for the reduction of tension along the ceasefire lines (see S/1996/1016). The Deputy Special Representative also remained in close touch with representatives of Governments that have been actively supporting my mission of good offices.

10. The third visit to the area by my Special Representative took place in mid-December. In Cyprus, he held two separate meetings with each of the two leaders. In Athens and Ankara, he met with senior Foreign Ministry officials. The main purpose of this visit was to assess the situation on the eve of my preparation of the present report. He found that the gap in the positions of the two sides had not narrowed and that each leader continued to express serious doubts about the true intentions of the other. This made it difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for direct talks. On the substance, the two leaders reiterated their well-known positions, as described in paragraph 6 above. The Greek Cypriot leader said that, in view of the campaign which would precede the presidential elections scheduled for February 1998, the window of opportunity for negotiations was likely to close by the autumn of 1997. My Special Representative reiterated to both leaders and to his interlocutors in Athens and Ankara the concern of the United Nations and the international community about the existing situation in Cyprus. He emphasized the urgent need for direct negotiations on an overall settlement and for intensified preparations for such negotiations to begin early in 1997, with the active support of Greece and Turkey.

11. In my last report I noted the growing international interest in the Cyprus problem, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the European Union. This has continued to intensify. During the period under review, senior officials from France, the EU Presidency (Ireland), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, in some cases several times. Their purpose was to help overcome the existing impasse by exploring possible ways of bringing the positions of the two sides closer together and to seek greater support from Greece and Turkey. The missions by the Special Representative of the EU Presidency focused in particular on a possible EU contribution to an overall settlement in the context of the EU’s decision to initiate accession negotiations with Cyprus. Such a contribution would include explanation of the benefits which EU membership would bring to all Cypriots and would also address Turkish Cypriot concerns about its implications for an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, particularly as regards bizonality, the Turkish guarantee and the relationship of Greece and Turkey with Cyprus. All the senior officials who undertook these missions recognized the importance of ensuring that the efforts of interested Governments are coordinated with those of the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices. To this end, regular consultations have taken place between the United Nations and representatives of interested Governments in Cyprus, at United Nations Headquarters and elsewhere.

III. OBSERVATIONS

12. The Cyprus problem has been at an impasse for a considerable time. Since my last report, the situation has deteriorated seriously and has been marked by a level of violence unprecedented since 1974. Frustration that a settlement has proved elusive for so long runs deep within both communities. Unless the political leadership on both sides manifests the necessary determination to negotiate an overall settlement and this process is fully supported by Greece and Turkey, the present unstable situationwill persist and even lead to greater dangers.

13. The developments of recent months and the military build-up in Cyprus have underscored what the Security Council has pointed out for so long, that the status quo in Cyprus is most unstable and is not tenable. The events of recent months are a warning. If the current situation is allowed to persist, the consequences will be to the detriment of both communities.

14. The apparent calm that has prevailed for some years has lulled political leaders and the people of both communities into a false sense of stability. Many continue to believe that the situation will remain stable until the underlying dispute is resolved. Beneath the surface, however, the situation in Cyprus is changing, in terms both of the demographic composition of the island and of the relationship of the two communities with each other and to the outside world. Either the two communities will take control of their destiny by reaching an overall settlement on the basis that has already been agreed, or forces beyond their control will fundamentally change the situation on the island.

15. As has often been pointed out before, the exercise of good offices by successive Secretaries-General has, over the years, generated the substantive elements necessary to reach an overall agreement, as well as the procedures for achieving that objective. I refer especially to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements in which the leaders of the two communities agreed on key principles of a solution, including the establishment of a bicommunal and bizonal federation whose independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed. Other key principles are to be found in Security Council resolutions, in the Set of Ideas and in other ideas explored in recent years. Procedurally, it has become evident that an overall settlement can best be reached through mutual concessions in a comprehensive negotiating session which will continue as long as necessary to reach agreement.

16. As the Security Council recognized in resolution 1062 (1996), the decision of the European Union to open accession negotiations with Cyprus is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement. That decision and the timetable that flows from it provide an additional important reason for both sides to redouble their efforts. It is clearly in the vital interests of both communities to reach a solution before accession negotiations begin. It is widely believed that the accession by Cyprus to EU membership in a manner consistent with the agreed basis for an overall settlement would offer both communities the opportunity for enhanced prosperity and security.

17. An urgent effort is accordingly required in 1997 to bring about early direct talks between the two leaders, in the manner described above, to negotiate an overall agreement. Both leaders should clearly and publicly commit themselves to such a process.

18. To facilitate this objective, preparations for direct negotiations are being intensified by the Secretariat. The extensive material which already exists is being reviewed and, as appropriate, updated and expanded, and additional material prepared, so that the United Nations will be in a position to help the leaders of the two communities reach common positions during their negotiations. In addition, more intensive contacts with the leaders of the two communities and with Greece and Turkey are planned for the new year, including longer visits to Cyprus and to the area by my Special Representative. I rely on continued support by interested Governments for these initiatives. I also call upon the Governments of Greece and Turkey, which have a special obligation to Cyprus, to become more active in support of the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices.

19. The success of this effort will depend to an important extent on the creation of an atmosphere of confidence and reconciliation between the two communities. Both leaders must give tangible indications that they are seeking an overall settlement on the basis of one country and to ensure that their words and deeds are in harmony with that objective. Such a change in attitude cannot wait for a settlement; it must precede it and should be adopted without delay. The emphasis in their public statements and in their communications with each other must shift away from polemics and mutual accusations and towards their future relationship in a federal Cyprus. Messages of reconciliation and tolerance from both leaders and their communities are long overdue.

20. Both sides should also implement goodwill measures that give tangible indications of their good intentions and help create an atmosphere of confidence. Such measures could include the following: crossing with minimal formality by members of both communities at the Ledra Palace checkpoint (e.g., by only presenting identity cards); facilitating bicommunal contacts; cooperation and joint projects in areas of inter-communal concern such as the environment, water, health, education (including the elimination of biased and negative representations of each other) and the restoration of historic sites; youth and student exchanges; bicommunal sports events; elimination of provocative emblems and slogans; island-wide telephone communications; and bicommunal commercial activities and trade. I call on both leaders to take such measures.

21. Furthermore, it is important that the UNFICYP proposals for further unmanning, the prohibition of loaded weapons and a military code of conduct along the ceasefire lines be agreed to and implemented without delay.

22. The current situation offers the two communities, and the region, both a warning signal and an opportunity. The two leaders have a responsibility to their communities and to Cyprus as a whole to recognize the seriousness of the moment and to seize the opportunity it presents by agreeing to negotiate a comprehensive settlement on the basis of mutual concessions and to facilitate this process by conveying to each other in both words and deeds a message of reconciliation. In conclusion, I call upon both leaders to cooperate with my Special Representative and my Deputy Special Representative and with the Governments that support the Secretary-General’s mission of good offices.

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S/1996/467 – Reports of the Secretary-General on his good offices mission

United Nations

S/1996/467

  Security Council Distr.: General

25 June 1996

Original: English

 


Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1032 (1995) of 19 December 1995. In paragraph 11 of that resolution, the Security Council requested me to submit a report during the current mandate period of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on my mission of good offices, including a full assessment of my efforts towards reaching a settlement of the situation in Cyprus.

II. MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES

2. In my last report on my mission of good offices, dated 29 October 1994 (S/1994/1229), I informed the Council, inter alia, that the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities had accepted my proposal that they meet in informal direct talks, together with my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel, with a view to exploring in a concrete manner ways in which progress might be made both in respect of the implementation of the confidence-building measures and in respect of the overall settlement of the Cyprus problem. I informed the Council that four such meetings had taken place and that I would keep the Council apprised of developments in the light of the continuing consultations. In a letter dated 4 November 1994 (S/1994/1256), the President of the Council advised me that the members of the Council had taken note of the aforementioned report and looked forward to receiving a definitive report at the appropriate time.

3. On 9 December 1994, I told the members of the Security Council that the two leaders had met five times with my Deputy Special Representative at his residence in the United Nations Protected Area (UNPA) in Nicosia for a combined duration of over 10 hours.

4. These meetings offered a good opportunity for the two leaders to explain their positions. The Turkish Cypriot leader urged that the first priority of the talks should be to reach an agreement on the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures relating principally to the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. The Greek Cypriot leader emphasized the importance, in the first instance, of confirming that when the two leaders each professed commitment to a bicommunal and bizonal federal solution they were indeed in agreement on the fundamental principles. He emphasized that such a solution required acceptance of the basic principles that had been endorsed by the Security Council, most recently in paragraph 2 of resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994, as well as acceptance of the definition of political equality endorsed by the Council in its resolution 750 (1992) of 10 April 1992. The Turkish Cypriot leader reaffirmed his commitment to a federal solution. However, on some aspects, notably sovereignty and political equality, his position remained at variance with Security Council resolutions.

5. During these meetings useful discussions took place on a number of other issues relevant to an overall agreement, notably security and guarantees; membership of the European Union; territory, displaced persons and property claims; the powers and functions of the federal Government; difficulties faced by the Turkish Cypriot community as a result of the Cyprus problem; and implementation of the confidence-building measures.

6. These informal discussions turned out to be inconclusive. But they ensured that each leader was well aware of the position of the other on all the main issues and they seemed to me to have opened up some encouraging prospects. I followed these up in meetings with the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders on 24 November and 2 December 1994, respectively. I commended the Greek Cypriot leader for his willingness to explore possible mutual compromises (or “trade-offs”) that would enable the two leaders to respond to each other’s concerns across the board. I urged the Turkish Cypriot leader to respond in a commensurate manner. I underlined to both leaders the promising possibilities offered by the trade-off approach as a means of negotiating an overall settlement, stressing that this opportunity should not be lost.

7. I regret that this effort on my part did not achieve concrete results, although I continued to believe that the informal talks of October 1994 had created unprecedented opportunities for making progress towards a comprehensive negotiated settlement. My subsequent efforts have been devoted to finding a basis for the resumption of direct talks between the two leaders. I asked my Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark, to visit the area for discussions with both leaders and with senior officials of Turkey and Greece and my Deputy Special Representative to continue his shuttle contacts with the two leaders. Mr. Clark visited Nicosia, Ankara and Athens in March and May 1995. In a briefing on 5 June 1995, Mr. Clark informed the members of the Security Council of his two visits to the area and his efforts to bring about face-to-face talks on an overall settlement, on the basis that both leaders would be willing to engage in discussion of possible trade-offs. He had not found it possible to define such a basis for the resumption of direct talks. He did not see prospects for movement in the near future, but the efforts of the United Nations would continue. Since then, numerous attempts by myself and interested Governments, both on and off the island, have not succeeded in breaking the impasse.

8. Most recently, I met personally with the Turkish Cypriot leader at Istanbul on 6 June 1996 and with the Greek Cypriot leader at Geneva on 11 June 1996. These meetings provided an opportunity to review the key aspects of the Cyprus problem. I expressed my concern that my mission of good offices had remained at a standstill for a long time and I pressed them to consider the negative consequences of this deadlock for both communities.

9. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community confirmed his commitment to a negotiated settlement arrived at through direct talks between the two leaders. However, he emphasized that in order to avoid yet another unproductive meeting, it would be necessary to ensure, through proximity talks, that sufficient common ground existed between the two sides before direct talks began. In this connection, he identified five key areas: security, membership in the European Union, territory, sovereignty and political equality. He underlined in particular that both communities felt insecure and that therefore an arrangement had to be devised that addressed with equal effectiveness the security concerns of both. The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee did not meet that objective and his community could not accept that Turkey had the right of unilateral intervention. He recalled his proposal for the demilitarization of Cyprus (see S/1994/680, paras. 25-27), coupled with an international force, which could include Greek and Turkish troops, on the basis of a revised United Nations mandate providing for the right of direct intervention to guarantee the overall agreed settlement as well as the security of each community.

10. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community reaffirmed his readiness to meet with the Greek Cypriot leader in direct talks within the parameters of: (a) an equal partnership that would treat the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities as equal in all aspects, including in decision-making in the federal Government; and (b) the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. He suggested that the Set of Ideas serve as the source of reference for direct talks. He voiced his opposition to any change in the 1960 Treaty, including Turkey’s right of unilateral intervention, and to Cyprus joining the European Union before Turkey, which he believed would negate the bizonal and bicommunal foundation for a settlement in Cyprus as well as the Treaty of Guarantee.

11. I emphasized yet again the importance of creating as soon as possible a basis for the resumption of direct talks between the two leaders. This should consist of mutual acknowledgement of the concerns of each side and mutual expression of a willingness to compromise. To this end, I called upon both to cooperate with the efforts of my new Special Representative, Mr. Han Sung-Joo, and his Deputy, Mr. Gustave Feissel. I informed both leaders that Mr. Han would visit Cyprus during the last week of June and would then proceed to Athens and Ankara.

 

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

12. During the period covered by the present report, several developments occurred that could affect the prospects for achieving an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem.

13. On 6 March 1995, the Council of Ministers of the European Union decided that the negotiations for the accession of Cyprus to the Union would begin six months after the conclusion of its Inter-Governmental Conference. While there is no definite date yet, it is estimated that the negotiations of the European Union with Cyprus are likely to begin in late 1997 or early 1998. At the same time, the Council of Ministers expressed its regret at the lack of progress in the talks under my auspices on a comprehensive settlement and called upon both parties to step up their efforts to achieve that goal in accordance with Security Council resolutions and the concept of a bicommunal and bizonal federation. The Council of Ministers further considered that membership of the European Union should bring increased security and prosperity to both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities and called on the European Commission to organize contacts with the Turkish Cypriot community in order to explain the benefits of European Union accession and to allay that community’s concerns.

14. During the period under review, interest in the Cyprus question has grown, in particular among the permanent members of the Security Council and members of the European Union and its Commission. This has been reflected, inter alia, in missions to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey by senior government officials and special representatives appointed by the Governments of Italy, in its capacity as President of the European Union, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. From 21 to 23 May 1995, the United States, in cooperation with the United Kingdom, convened a meeting in London with representatives of the leaders of the two communities. Its objective, like that of the United Nations, was to find a basis for the resumption of direct talks. However, no progress was achieved. In addition, senior officials of France, Germany, Ireland, Spain and the European Commission also undertook fact-finding visits to Cyprus.

15. On 17 April 1996, representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council met at United Nations Headquarters with senior members of the Secretariat. Those present exchanged views on the situation in Cyprus and reaffirmed that the status quo was unacceptable. They underlined the importance of a comprehensive approach to an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions, the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements and the Secretary-General’s good offices mission.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

16. The negotiations on Cyprus have been at an impasse for too long. My report of 19 November 1992 (S/24830) described the deadlock reached in my efforts to base an overall agreement on the Set of Ideas and the map endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 774 (1992) of 26 August 1992. Efforts during the following year and a half to reach agreement on the package of confidence-building measures related in particular to the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport were also blocked.

17. Thirty-two years after the first involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus conflict and 22 years after the events of 1974, the international community can reasonably demand evidence that both parties, and others concerned, are serious in their pursuit of an overall settlement on the basis the two parties agreed almost 20 years ago. The Security Council has repeatedly stated that the existing status quo is unacceptable. No one can objectively believe that it provides a viable basis for preserving the character and security of the two communities.

18. This absence of progress is especially disappointing when, as I have repeatedly pointed out, the elements required to construct an overall settlement have been identified. I refer to the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, to the resolutions of the Security Council, to the various ideas that have been elaborated over the years through the United Nations good offices and to the concept of mutual concessions, or “trade-offs”, that emerged during the direct talks between the two leaders in October 1994 as the most promising methodology for working out an overall agreement.

19. In addition, the decision of the European Union to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus in 1997 or 1998 is an important new development that should facilitate an overall settlement. As the Council of Ministers of the European Union has pointed out, accession promises enhanced security and prosperity for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. The European Commission’s efforts to explain to the Turkish Cypriot community the benefits of membership in the European Union and to allay its concerns are important in this regard. The imminence of the accession negotiations should also instil a new sense of urgency to the search for an overall agreement.

20. What is now required is a concerted effort by the international community to build on these developments and to give a new impetus to the negotiating process.

21. Greece and Turkey have a special responsibility. It is crucial that they should not only lend their active support to the search for a settlement but should also ensure that their own relations do not develop in a way that endangers that search.

22. A number of other Member States, including the five permanent members of the Security Council and the members of the European Union, have recently provided gratifying evidence of their readiness to add their weight to a coordinated effort to support my mission of good offices in a common endeavour to help the two communities in Cyprus secure peace and prosperity in their island.

23. But the main responsibility will continue to rest with the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. A lasting settlement will not be achieved unless the two leaders can persuade their communities that their interests will be better served by flexibility and compromise than by continuing confrontation. I conclude this report by calling upon the two leaders to work with me, and with the many countries that support my mission of good offices, to break the present impasse and establish common ground on which direct negotiations can be resumed.

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S/1994/380 – Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

United Nations

S/1994/380

  Security Council Distr.: General

4 April 1994

Original: English

 


Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 902 (1994) of 11 March 1994. In paragraph 4, the Council requested me to submit a report by the end of March 1994 on the outcome of my efforts to finalize an agreement on the modalities for the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures first described in my report to the Council of 1 July 1993 (S/26026).

2. In my most recent report to the Security Council (S/1994/262), on 4 March 1994, I informed the Council of the efforts that I had made since my previous report submitted on 22 November 1993 (S/26777). By the end of February, the discussions on the seven issues on the agreed agenda of the proximity talks with the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus had clarified to a large extent their respective positions. It was agreed that my representatives should put forward ideas designed to assist the two parties to reach a common position by reconciling their views on each of the issues that comprised the agenda.

3. A paper entitled “Draft ideas for the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures” was presented to each leader on 9 March by my Deputy Special Representative, Mr. Gustave Feissel. On 16 and 18 March, Mr. Feissel engaged in extensive discussions of the draft ideas with each leader. On the basis of these discussions, an adjusted version of the draft ideas was prepared, taking into account many of the points raised by each side. My Special Representative, Mr. Joe Clark, returned to Cyprus on 19 March and remained there until 23 March. During his stay, meetings took place with each leader on 21, 22 and 23 March in an attempt to reach an agreement on the basis of the adjusted ideas as presented to both leaders on 21 March.

4. In commenting to Mr. Clark on the 21 March text of the ideas, the Turkish Cypriot leader voiced numerous objections, stating that the ideas contained changes from the wording of the package of 1 July 1993 in favour of the Greek Cypriot side. He emphasized in particular his continuing objections to the proposals in the ideas related to security of access between the United Nations-controlled buffer zone and Varosha, the arrangements concerning traffic rights at Nicosia International Airport, the schedule for the implementation of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package, especially regarding the timing of benefits to the Turkish Cypriot community and the collection by the United Nations of customs duties in both areas. The leader of the Greek Cypriot community stated that, while he did not like many of the changes that had been introduced in the 21 March text, he was prepared to accept that revised text if the Turkish Cypriot leader would do likewise.

5. Before leaving Cyprus on 23 March, Mr. Clark stated publicly that he had not received from the Turkish Cypriot side the agreement that he had hoped for on the implementation of the package. He stated that there was still time to reach an agreement before I had to submit my report to the Security Council and that he hoped that news would be received from the Turkish Cypriot side that would make an agreement possible. He stated that Mr. Feissel would remain in touch with both leaders.

6. On 28 March, Mr. Feissel again met with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community to pursue discussions to reach an agreement on the ideas for the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures. At the conclusion of this meeting, Mr. Feissel confirmed publicly that there had been no new developments and that the Turkish Cypriot side had not provided the response necessary to make an agreement on the implementation of the confidence-building measures possible.

7. I continue to believe that the package of confidence-building measures, combined with the revised ideas of 21 March 1994, offers real benefits to both sides, which would accrue to each in a fair and timely manner. During the next few weeks, my representatives and I will continue high-level contacts with the two Cypriot parties and others in pursuit of an agreement on the present basis. I shall report in greater detail by the end of April on those contacts and on the substance of the proximity talks, together with my recommendations to the Security Council as to what further measures it may wish to consider.

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S/1994/262 – Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

United Nations

S/1994/262

  Security Council Distr.: General

4 March 1994

Original: English

 


Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is provided pursuant to Security Council resolution 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993. In paragraph 10 of that resolution, the Council welcomed my decision to resume intensive contacts with both sides and with others concerned and to concentrate at that stage on achieving an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures, intended to facilitate the political process towards an overall settlement. In paragraph 12 of the same resolution, the Council requested me to submit a report by the end of February 1994 on the outcome of my efforts to achieve an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures.

2. In my most recent report to the Security Council, on 22 November 1993 (S/26777), I informed the Council of the efforts that I had made, following the unsuccessful joint high-level meeting of the leaders of the two communities in late May at United Nations Headquarters (see S/26026), to achieve an agreement on a number of confidence-building measures, in particular the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport under United Nations administration (see S/26777, paras. 45-49).

II. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MY LAST REPORT

3. On 17 December 1993, I wrote in identical terms to the leaders of the two communities, to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to the President of the Security Council. I transmitted for their information the reports of the two teams of experts that I had sent in October and November 1993 to Cyprus, with the assistance of the United Nations Development Programme and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), to assess the economic benefits to the two communities of the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport and to identify the technical requirements for reopening Nicosia International Airport. I reiterated my hope for an early agreement and stressed that it should be possible for the leaders of both communities to accept in principle the package of confidence-building measures as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026), on the understanding that its provisions would be fully implemented (for the text of the letter, see annex I to the present report).

4. In Cyprus, Mr. Gustave Feissel, my Deputy Special Representative, sought from the two leaders an agreement in principle on the package so that Mr. Joe Clark, my Special Representative, could focus on implementation of the package during a visit to the island in late January 1994. On 20 January, Mr. Denkta, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, informed me that he was ready to cooperate with me with a view to reaching an agreement on the package of confidence-building measures that his side accepted in principle in the light of a number of understandings stated in his letter.

5. During Mr. Clark’s visit to Cyprus from 22 to 26 January 1994, he had extensive discussions with the leaders of the two communities. President Clerides, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, had reaffirmed his acceptance in principle of the package of confidence-building measures on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport as set out in my letter of 17 December 1993 and his readiness to discuss the modalities for implementing that package once the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community had also accepted it. In his discussions with Mr. Denkta, Mr. Clark underlined the importance of ensuring that the acceptance in principle by the Turkish Cypriot side was fully in line with my letter of 17 December 1993.

6. From Cyprus, Mr. Clark, accompanied by Mr. Feissel, proceeded to Greece, where on 26 January he met Foreign Minister Papoulias and then to Turkey, where on 28 January he met Foreign Minister Cetin and other senior officials. In these meetings, Mr. Clark underlined the importance of proceeding unequivocally and without further delay so that a formal agreement might be reached quickly on the package of confidence-building measures. Foreign Minister Papoulias conveyed his Government’s broad support for my efforts. Foreign Minister Cetin affirmed Turkey’s acceptance in principle of the package of confidence-building measures in line with my letter of 17 December 1993.

7. On 27 January, Mr. Clerides sent me a letter in which he reaffirmed his acceptance of the package of confidence-building measures and set out his assessment of the situation taking into account Mr. Denkta’s letter of 20 January. On 28 January, in a further letter, Mr. Denkta confirmed that the Turkish Cypriot side accepted in principle the package of confidence-building measures as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) and that he was ready to discuss the modalities for the implementation of that package.

8. Upon his return to Cyprus, Mr. Feissel met with both leaders on 1 February to review the situation in the light of the above-mentioned correspondence. Both leaders confirmed their acceptance in principle of the package and their readiness to work out the modalities for its implementation.

9. On 3 February 1994 I wrote in identical terms to the two leaders. I noted that both sides had accepted in principle the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) and had indicated their readiness to work out the modalities for its implementation. I underlined that, in order to achieve the intended effect of confidence-building, it was important that the modalities for implementing the package should be worked out within two months at the most.

10. In my letter of 3 February, I also called on both leaders to abide by the following considerations when working out the modalities for implementing the package: “(a) given the purpose of confidence-building measures, neither side should seek any political advantage or require the other side to make political concessions; (b) the content of the package set out in the above-mentioned paragraphs of my 1 July 1993 report should be faithfully adhered to; (c) when there is formal agreement by both sides on the implementation of the package, it will be fully and promptly implemented and no impediments will be placed in its way by either side; and (d) the purpose of the package of confidence-building measures is to facilitate speedy progress on an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem and the package is not a substitute for that objective”.

11. I asked both leaders to pursue intensive discussions in Nicosia with my representatives, beginning in mid-February, in order to work out agreement on a limited number of key issues related to the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package. I also asked them to agree that more detailed matters related to the implementation of the package be left to the United Nations to work out, in consultation with the two sides, in the exercise of its function of administrator provided for in the package.

12. I also informed both leaders that Mr. Clark would come to Cyprus for the initial phase of the discussions and that they would then continue with Mr. Feissel. I informed the two leaders that I had requested Mr. Feissel to meet with them immediately in order to identify the key issues that would make up the agenda of the discussions.

13. On 15 February 1994, the two leaders agreed to a text setting out the arrangements for working out the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures (see annex II). The two leaders committed themselves to enter into intensive discussions with my representatives in Nicosia in order to reach a common understanding on 6 key issues related to the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package as well as on arrangements for the implementation of the 12 other confidence-building measures set out in annex I to my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026).

14. The two leaders further agreed that, after having heard the views of the two sides on these issues, my representatives would prepare a note on each issue as a basis for discussion with the two leaders. They also agreed that other matters related to the implementation of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package would be worked out by the United Nations, in the exercise of the function of administrator provided for in the package, with the advice and assistance of the two sides. Finally the two leaders agreed that they would faithfully respect the considerations set out in paragraph 10 above.

15. The proximity talks were launched on 17 February 1994 by Mr. Clark, who had returned to Cyprus for this purpose. Mr. Clark had two extensive meetings with each leader, during which each of the seven issues that make up the agenda of the proximity talks was discussed and specific matters on which agreement was being sought were identified. Since the departure of Mr. Clark from Cyprus on 20 February, two further meetings have been held with each leader by Mr. Feissel, during which matters related to the seven issues were explored further. Intensive meetings with both leaders continued during the first week of March.

16. By the end of the meetings on Friday, 25 February, my representatives concluded that the discussions with each side had clarified their respective positions to the point where it should be possible for my representatives, in line with the agreement reached on 15 February, to put forward ideas on each of the seven issues with a view to helping the two leaders to reach a formal agreement on the package quickly. Discussion of these ideas will begin with both leaders during the coming days.

III. THE AGENDA OF THE PROXIMITY TALKS

17. In line with the arrangements accepted on 15 February, the two leaders had agreed to reach a common understanding on the implementation of seven key issues and to leave it to the United Nations to work out other matters of detail related to the package, with the advice and assistance of the two sides.

18. On the first key issue, that of the United Nations administration of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport, it was strongly suggested by my representatives that the discussions with the two leaders should focus on fundamental aspects and that the leaders should not become embroiled in every detail.

19. Regarding the United Nations administration of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport, it is essential to bear in mind that the package accepted in principle by both leaders clearly states that it is the United Nations (in the case of Nicosia International Airport, in cooperation with ICAO), and neither of the two sides, nor both, that will administer the two areas.

20. An Administrator will have to be appointed in each area and clearly he or she will have to be acceptable to both sides. The precise manner in which the powers and functions of the Administrator are to be conferred on him or her will also need to be agreed. In this connection, it is clear that agreement would not be possible on the basis of delegation of powers or functions to the Administrator by existing structures on the island. The answer to this question may need to flow from an agreement that would be reached by the leaders of the two communities in their representative capacities and endorsed by the Security Council.

21. The package already provides, in respect of the fenced area of Varosha, that the Administrator could, in the execution of his functions, enlist the advice and assistance of both communities. The broad mechanisms for this process would need to be clear in advance. The Chambers of Commerce and Industry would assist the Administrator in developing and implementing intercommunal trade for the benefit of both communities. Other organizations of the two communities, selected by the Administrator, would assist him in developing and implementing intercommunal contact.

22. The package provides that the laws to be applied in the fenced area of Varosha will be those that were in force in Cyprus on 1 December 1963. It would be necessary to agree on a mechanism by which the United Nations Administrator might be able to supplement that body of law where it proves to be inadequate or outdated.

23. The package also provides that legal cases involving persons from both communities would be heard jointly by a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot magistrate designated by their respective communities. Bearing this in mind, mechanisms will need to be agreed by which the United Nations Administrator would make judicial appointments and agreed arrangements will have to govern the functions of such appointments.

24. It was also recalled by my representatives that the United Nations, in its capacity as administrator, would be responsible for the security of the fenced area of Varosha and of Nicosia International Airport and that it would present to both sides the specific arrangements which it would propose to put in place to this end. It was also noted that arrangements would have to be worked out to ensure unhindered and secure travel between the southern part of the island and the fenced area of Varosha, without which the package would not be feasible.

25. It is difficult to envisage the restoration of Nicosia International Airport or the reconstruction of the fenced area of Varosha getting under way if the areas concerned are not under United Nations administration. Accordingly, United Nations administration of both would need to commence shortly after agreement is reached on implementing the package and could not realistically be deferred until, for example, the areas have been respectively restored and reconstructed.

26. It will be recalled that the costs of the administration and security of the fenced area of Varosha, as well as those of making Nicosia International Airport operational and of its administration, operation and security, would be borne locally in an agreed manner. Local sources of revenue might include taxation, customs duties on imports at points of entry to the fenced area and at Nicosia International Airport and concession fees at Nicosia International Airport. It is hoped that some international assistance might be made available.

27. As to the second main issue, that related to the schedule for implementing the package, the key questions that have to be resolved by the two leaders are: the date on which the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport will be placed under United Nations administration, which will be followed by the reconstruction and restoration of the two areas respectively; the date on which Nicosia International Airport will be reopened for operations; and the date on which phase II of the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha will begin. Both leaders envisage a degree of synchronization in the realization of the various benefits that will flow to each side. The package contains such a wide spread of benefits for each side that there is ample scope for the two leaders to agree on a schedule for implementing the package that will bring real and tangible benefits to both sides at each stage.

28. With regard to the third main issue, the two leaders will need to reach a common understanding on the arrangement for making the fenced area of Varosha a special area for bicommunal contact and commerce. This objective has been one of the important elements of the package since its inception. It involves in particular the economic opportunities in the fenced area that would be available to Turkish Cypriots. While bearing in mind the resolutions of the Security Council that bear upon this area, it is true to say that the manner in which this aspect of the package is given effect in the implementation stage is important, not only for the success of the package itself, but also for the objective of bringing Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots together again in a bicommunal and bizonal federation. As mentioned in paragraph 21 above, the Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the two communities will assist the United Nations in developing and implementing intercommunal trade for the benefit of both communities and other organizations of the two communities selected by the United Nations will assist it in developing and implementing intercommunal contact.

29. The package provides for foreign airlines that have traffic rights in Cyprus and for airlines registered in Turkey to have traffic rights at Nicosia International Airport. The manner in which this will be done represents the fourth main issue on the agenda of the current proximity talks. The two leaders need to reach a common understanding so that it will be clear which specific airlines will have landing rights at Nicosia International Airport in the future, taking account of existing international practice and the special circumstances that are addressed by this package.

30. The fifth main issue is the safe operation of Nicosia International Airport, which is essentially a technical matter. It relates to the safety of flights, both incoming and outgoing, using Nicosia International Airport and to the need, in this context, for arrangements that will preserve the safety of flights to and from other airports on the island, bearing in mind established international practice.

31. The package provides that Nicosia International Airport would be open for civilian passenger and cargo traffic and access would be free between the airport and both sides. The manner in which this will be done represents the sixth main issue on the agenda of the proximity talks. In this connection, and bearing in mind consideration (a) in paragraph 10 above, arrangements will need to be agreed to enable Turkish Cypriots to travel overseas unhindered, direct from Nicosia. This represents a key benefit of the package for the Turkish Cypriot community, and an agreement for implementing the package is difficult to envisage without there being agreed arrangements in this regard.

32. As to the seventh main issue, the two leaders have again confirmed their agreement in principle to the 12 other confidence-building measures set out in annex I to my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026). It should be possible to implement these confidence-building measures as soon as formal agreement has been reached on the package. Indeed, several of these confidence-building measures could prove to be helpful in providing significant benefits to the two sides during the early period after the package has been approved by the two leaders. Such benefits would be additional to those that would result immediately after the formal approval of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package, such as the commencement of a flow of foreign visitors from the southern part of the island to the northern part of the island via the fenced area of Varosha.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

33. It is positive that the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus have accepted in principle the package of confidence-building measures and that they have begun intensive discussions in Nicosia with my representatives on the basis of agreed arrangements to work out the modalities for implementing the package.

34. I have received in recent days a report from my representatives concerning the first four meetings with each leader. The proceedings to date have clarified the positions of the two sides to the point where my representatives can now bring forward, in regard to each of the main issues in the agreed agenda, ideas that ought to enable the two leaders to reach common understandings on the implementation of the package. The considerations set out in the preceding section of the present report should prove helpful to the two leaders in achieving this objective quickly.

35. I must emphasize here that, for the package to achieve its purpose of building confidence between the two communities, the current proximity talks cannot be drawn out. They need to achieve a positive conclusion without delay. I know that I am joined by members of the Security Council when I say that the international community is counting on all concerned to achieve this end.

36. In addition to the important economic gains that each side will receive, I remain convinced that the implementation of this package will transform the atmosphere on the island. The confidence-building measures will open avenues of contact between the two communities that will give to each the opportunity to manifest its good will towards the other and to lay the foundation for the kind of relationship that should exist in a federation. Agreement will represent the most important development on the island in two decades and will open a new and more positive vista for the future. On the other hand, the consequences of failure will certainly be very negative.

37. Given the necessary good will, it ought to be possible for the two leaders to bring the proximity talks to a positive conclusion within a few weeks. The Security Council may therefore consider it appropriate to undertake towards the end of March the thorough review it decided on in resolution 889 (1993). I would accordingly propose to report further to the Security Council later in March.

38. Finally, I wish to place on record my appreciation for the continuing support being extended to these efforts by ICAO in providing valuable expertise in connection with the proposals to reopen Nicosia International Airport.

Annex I

Letter of 17 December 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed

to the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, to the Prime

Ministers of Greece and Turkey and to the President of the

Security Council

I am pleased to send you herewith the full reports of the team of experts which I sent to Cyprus to assess the economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package of confidence-building measures and of the team of experts to identify the technical requirements for reopening the airport.

The report of the team of experts on the economic benefits of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package concludes that the “implementation of the package would yield significant benefits for both communities”. The team goes on to state that “the benefits would be relatively greater for the Turkish Cypriot side because of the relative size of its economy and their impact in alleviating the serious obstacles currently confronting the Turkish Cypriot economy”.

The report of the team of experts on the rehabilitation of Nicosia International Airport confirms the feasibility of reopening the airport in accordance with ICAO Technical and Operational Standards at a relatively modest cost of about US$ 36 million and that the rehabilitation could be completed within 18 months of a decision to proceed.

In my report to the Council of 22 November 1993 (S/26777), I stated that, following the 12 December 1993 elections in the Turkish Cypriot community, I would resume intensive contacts with all concerned with a view to achieving an early agreement on the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package. I said that the Government of Turkey’s declared support of the package and its assurances of speedy developments after the elections were expected to bring positive results. My expectations for an early agreement have been further strengthened by the reports of the teams of experts which have clearly confirmed the important benefits of the package for both communities as well as the feasibility of its implementation. In resolution 889 (1993), the Council reaffirmed its expectation that rapid progress will be made in achieving an agreement.

It should therefore be possible for the leaders of both communities now to accept in principle the package of confidence-building measures as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of my report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) on the understanding that its provisions will be fully implemented. Matters related to the modalities for ensuring the effective implementation of the package could be considered in meetings in Nicosia of the two leaders with my Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative. In resolution 889 (1993), the Council also requested me to submit a report by the end of February 1994 on the outcome of my efforts in preparation for its thorough review of the situation in Cyprus.

I have requested my Special Representative to visit Ankara, Athens and Nicosia in mid-January to enlist the urgent support of all concerned for this initiative, in accordance with the expectations of the international community.

Annex II

Arrangements for working out the modalities for implementing the

package of confidence-building measures dated 15 February 1994

1. To ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the package of confidence-building measures on Varosha and Nicosia International Airport as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of, and the other confidence-building measures set out in annex I to, the Secretary-General’s report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) and in line with the Secretary-General’s letter of 3 February 1994, the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus agree to enter into intensive discussions with the representatives of the Secretary-General beginning on 17 February 1994 in order to reach a common understanding of the implementation of the following key issues:

(a) United Nations administration of Nicosia International Airport and of the fenced area of Varosha, including unhindered and secure travel to and from the fenced area;

(b) The schedule for the transfer of the fenced area of Varosha to United Nations administration as well as for the reopening of the fenced area of Varosha, including the reclaiming of possession of property by its owners, and schedule for the reopening of Nicosia International Airport under United Nations administration;

(c) Arrangements for making the fenced area of Varosha a special area for bicommunal contact and commerce;

(d) Traffic rights of airlines at Nicosia International Airport;

(e) The safe operation of Nicosia International Airport;

(f) The free movement of people and goods through Nicosia International Airport;

(g) Arrangements for the implementation of the confidence-building measures set out in annex I to the Secretary-General’s report of 1 July 1993 (S/26026).

2. After having heard the views of the two sides on the above issues, the representatives of the Secretary-General will prepare a note on each issue as a basis for discussion with the two leaders. Other matters related to the implementation of the Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package will be worked out by the United Nations, in exercise of the function of administrator provided for in the package, with the advice and assistance of the two sides.

3. The two leaders agree that they will faithfully respect the following considerations:

(a) Given the purpose of confidence-building measures, neither side will seek any political advantage or require the other side to make political concessions;

(b) The content of the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of document S/26026 will be faithfully adhered to;

(c) When formal agreement is reached on the implementation of the package, it will be implemented fully and promptly and no impediments will be placed in its way by either side;

(d) The purpose of the package of confidence-building measures is to facilitate speedy progress on an overall settlement of the Cyprus problem, and the package is not a substitute for that objective.

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